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Abstract 
With a range of documented attacks against RFID systems a majority of the current literature is focused on the 
encryption of the communication. This paper addresses such attacks by proposing alternative means of 
protection through utilising some of the same methods that may be used to attack these systems. The proposed 
methods would allow for increased security within a range of RFID applications whilst still allowing for normal 
operations compliant with the relevant standards. 
Keywords 
Radio Frequency Identification, RFID, Active Jamming, Attack, Wireless Security 
INTRODUCTION 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) relies on transponders which are incorporated into an object for the 
purpose of identification or tracking (Engels, 2004). The transponder (or tag) may be used to store information 
and will respond to signals sent by a transceiver (RFID reader). Increasingly such technology is being 
incorporated into supply chain management systems throughout the world and is expected to eventually replace 
traditional bar-coding systems (Ahson & Ilyas, 2008). A barrier to the uptake of RFID systems was the lack of 
interoperability between manufacturers, which has been addressed by the creation and dissemination of the 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) standard (Bolan, 2007c). The EPC standard governs the whole scope of an 
RFID system including the operation of compliant ts and readers (EPCglobal, 2005).  
A range of work has been published on how the standard is vulnerable to a range of attacks and how through the 
utilisation of such attacks an attacker would be able to shutdown an EPC RFID system completely with a very 
low cost device (Ahson & Ilyas, 2008; Bolan, 2006; Bolan, 2007b). Some of the less permanent denial of 
service attacks would still prove effective as no countermeasures exist within the standard to mitigate their 
effects (Bolan, 2007c). Given these issues this work looks at such attacks to detail how the weakness and 
techniques that exploit these issues might be used to develop countermeasures or mitigate such attacks.  
THE THREAT OF ATTACK 
The discarding of used RFID tags in passive based EPC Class One RFID systems may be seen as a normal part 
of a tags lifecycle (Hunt, Puglia & Puglia, 2007). Given this feature the standard suggests that discarded tags 
may be issued a KILL command to ‘destroy’ EPC complaint RFID tags which according to the standard 
(EPCglobal, 2005, p.40) is irreversible.   
It was found in Bolan (2006) that to a standard complaint RFID reader that killed tags appeared non-responsive 
and acted in accordance with the standard (EPCglobal, 2005).  The actual ‘KILL’ instruction consists of eight 
bits (11000100) and is standard to all compliant tags, however the instruction is actually part of an overall 
command illustrated in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The EPC ‘KILL’ Command (EPCglobal, 2005, p.59) 
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The ‘KILL’ operation takes place as follows: 
1. The Interrogator issues a Request Random Number (Req_RN ) command 
2. The Tag responds with a 16bit random number (RN) verified with a 16bit Cyclic Redundancy Check 
(CRC-16) 
3. Using the acquired random number the Interrogator issues the KILL command using the Command 
(11000100), the most significant bits (bit range 31-16) EXOR the tag supplied random number, the 
Tags handle and a CRC-16 
4. The Tag accepts the command and responds with its handle and a CRC-16 
5. The Interrogator issues a second Request Random Number (Req_RN ) command 
6. The Tag supplies a new 16bit random number (RN) verified with a CRC-16 
7. Using the acquired random number the Interrogator issues a second KILL command using the 
Command (11000100), the least significant bits (bit range 15-1) EXOR the tag supplied random 
number, the Tags handle and a CRC-16 
8. If all steps were followed correctly the Tag responds with the KILL SUCCESS response after which it 
will “render itself silent and shall not respond to an Interrogator thereafter” (EPCglobal, 2005, p.58) 
The major risk of such functionality is that an attacker could use the feature to ‘kill’ or wipe all tags in a 
business. Such an attack would only require knowledge of the ‘self-destruct’ code and a suitable transceiver 
within range of the transponder that is to be deactivated. While such an attack was noted in the original design 
of the command in RFID systems, Sarma et al. (2002) suggested that a pervasive network of readers might be 
used to detect unauthorised ‘self-destruct’ commands. However, they fail to explain if such a system would then 
allow the blocking of the command or if the network would simply detect the command and let the tags be ‘self-
destructed’. Whilst evidence of this type of attack against live systems have yet to be documented this may be 
due to the lack of wide scale adoption or a reticence to report such a loss.  
 
Another documented attack of concern emanates from eavesdropping on RFID communications. Eavesdropping 
may be seen as a passive listening attack on authorised transceiver/transponder communications, which in some 
literature is referred to as spying (Oertel et al., 2004). In this type of attack the attacker simply monitors and 
records all transmissions that can later be decoded for analysis and other malicious purposes. Such an attack 
would be difficult to detect as the attacker is not required to actively probe or interact with the system (figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  Annotated findings from an Active Jamming Attack   
Bolan (2008a) demonstrated a successful eavesdropping attack against a Generation One EPC setup using a 
custom made device, illustrating the ease in which such an attack may be carried out. The results revealed that 
EPC Gen One communications are carried out completely in the clear, and may be intercepted by anyone within 
range of the transmissions. This reinforces earlier assertions by other researchers who have cited such attacks as 
viable without providing proofs (Sarma et al., 2002; Juels, 2006). Whilst it has been argued that such an attack 
would become a more difficult exercise with an appropriate encryption added to the standard it is notable that 
the second generation of the standard still lacks this feature (EPC Global, 2005). This may be attributable to the 
difficulty of implementing a secure encryption method that may be implemented on a fast response – 
computational limited environment such as that offered by passive RFID systems. 
A third possibility for attack arises from the possibility of tag spoofing. In computing the term ‘spoofing’, 
historically referred to the creation of TCP/IP packets using another’s IP address thereby gaining some 
advantage (Basta & Hatton, 2008).  A classic example of such an attack is given in the field of cryptography in 
the form of a man in the middle attack where an attacker uses spoofing to fool both parties in a communication 
that he is the other party. Thus the attacker receives all communications without the need for cryptanalytic 
activities. This type of attack is detailed in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Man in the middle attack 
An attack of this nature was shown Bolan (2009) demonstrating a spoofing attack against a Generation One EPC 
setup using a custom made device. The spoofing process is relatively simple requiring the following steps: 
1. Upon power up and after a preamble is sent by the reader 
2. The Spoofer backscatters any RN16.  
3. The Interrogator acknowledges the Tag by sending an ACK. 
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4. If the Tag receives the ACK and ignores checking responding with a spoofed PC, EPC, and CRC-
16 
5. The reader then accepts the spoofer as a valid tag and adds it to an inventory of contactable tags 
Again, any large-scale system utilising RFID would be highly vulnerable to such an attack but there is a lack of 
data on if such an attack has yet to occur against a commercial system.  
PREVENTING TAGS FROM BEING ATTACKED 
Due to the current implementations of the standard any alteration of tag operations would require the costly and 
time consuming replacement of all RFID tags within a system before the vulnerability would be removed. One 
possible avenue that must be considered are the TALK and QUIET commands which are used to simplify tag to 
reader communication by removing the likelihood of tag collisions (EPCGlobal, 2005b, p.6).  
This is achieved through the issuance of a valid QUIET command which renders a given tag silent until a valid 
TALK command is issued or the tag is powered down for any period greater than one second. Typically this 
command is never explicitly sent by a user but is employed by the RFID reader on all tags within range as a 
default during communication with a single tag. However, this method requires a standard compliant reader in 
transmission range of every tag, which is unlikely given the range and power of EPC equipment (Bolan, 2008). 
This leads then to the idea of utilising active jamming to prevent tags from responding to any command, let 
alone a KILL request. Active jamming is a well known technique of attack against any technology that utilises 
radio based communication (Pleikys, 2003). Put simply, this technique requires the jamming of the radio 
frequency on which an RFID system operates in order to disrupt the operation of all transponders and 
transceivers within signal range of the jamming device. It is widely stated (Peris-Lopez, Hernandez-Castro, 
Estevez-Tapiador, & Ribagorda, 2006) that any part of an RFID system disabled by such methods would 
immediately return to functionality once the jamming device has been disabled or moved from range. 
Both the Air Interface for EPC tags and the ISO18000-6 standards allow for Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum (FHSS) for the reader to tag communications. Utilising this allowance, a number of countries, 
including the U.S. and Australia, have permitted the use of FHSS for RFID implementations. This means that an 
RFID reader may, in a pseudo-random sequence, hop between channels within the operating band of 
frequencies.   
A critical reason behind the usage of FHSS is the assertion that it provides some immunity to Denial of Service 
(DoS) from in-band interference. Such assertions seem to stem from the use of FHSS in typical ‘symmetric’ 
systems. In symmetric FHSS implementations, both transmitter and receiver lock step, that is the receiver hops 
with the transmitter to each new channel within the operating frequency. In contrast, RFID systems employ 
‘asymmetric’ FHSS, with only the transmitter hopping between channels and the RFID tag, due to processing 
limitations and lack of continuous power, regarding the entire band as a single channel. This means that while a 
reader may avoid a noisy channel by hopping to the next, an RFID tag is unable to do this. The tag effectively 
listens on all channels at once and thus, will attempt to react to a signal occurring anywhere within the entire 
band. 
In Bolan (2007b) it was shown that by broadcasting an active signal within range of a group of RFID tags would 
render those tags silent for the duration of the jamming signal. This attack is illustrated in the figure 4 below 
showing that the addition of the tag is logged by the reader and labelled with a number 1 above with an 
accompanying reading from the oscilloscope labelled number 5. The attack signal is then introduced and is 
recorded via another capture from the oscilloscope which illustrates the spike of activity in label 6. The injection 
of the attack signal into the system is accompanied by a loss of tag to reader communication and this is recorded 
by the reader as the tag being removed from the communication field and logged in the diagram as label 2. After 
the period of attack is over the attack signal is then removed (label 7) and almost instantly the reader re-
establishes communication and reregisters the ‘adding’ of the tag in label 3. This may be considered an active 
jamming attack.  
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Figure 4.  Annotated findings from an Active Jamming Attack   
 
Admittedly the system would require coverage over an area that would include all the tags to be protected but if 
possible not include any active service area. To illustrate this idea let us explore the scenario of an RFID 
enabled storage. In this situation the shelving area would be blanketed by the jamming signal as illustrated in 
figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Warehouse with distributed jamming 
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In this example active jamming devices located in the centre of the red shaded regions (denoting their range) 
effectively render the warehouse area (blue rectangle) dead to RFID traffic. This would prevent an attacker from 
not only perpetrating the KILL attack but also other types of attack, including spoofing, or eavesdropping. When 
the RFID system was required, the jamming signal could be lifted. Whilst this system may be impracticable 
during hours of normal operation as the RFID may be constantly required, it would prevent such attacks 
occurring during times when the warehouse was closed. Conversely, this proposal may not be appropriate in 
systems where the need for availability is constant or there is a possibility of signal leakage from the jamming. 
This is of course in the early stages of development and will require further testing to validate the viability of the 
solution before implementation in a commercial setting.  The ideas behind the RFID jamming approach have 
however been demonstrated individually as viable methods of attack. Yet, until more significant metrics on 
amounts of RFID attacks within current installations are gathered and when they occur it is impossible to 
quantify or even speculate as to the actual outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed a method for using active jamming against a users own system to reduce the likelihood of 
attacks such as the KILL attack. Whilst cognisant of the limitations of this approach, it may well offer the best 
and perhaps only defence against attacks of this nature against this specific generation of tags until a new 
standard is ratified. The potentially catastrophic effects of having a large amount of RFID tags wiped without 
any simple or quick recovery mechanism may then be considered to offset any limitations in operation. When 
viewed in this light the use of active jamming for defensive purposes may be a genuine approach until an update 
in the EPC standard occurs. 
The paper also highlighted the large amount of future work in this area that is required. Such work will always 
be somewhat theoretical in nature until true metrics are gathered as to the real occurrences of such attacks and 
adjoining analysis of how such attacks were carried out. Thus, such analysis may form the basis for the next step 
in this research before data may be gathered on any possible reductions or benefits that active jamming would 
allow. 
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